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Abstract
Mainstream endogenous growth models assume that new knowledge is embodied into
new intermediate or final goods, monopolistically supplied by the patent holder. Recent
technological progress, however, often gives rise to pure intellectual contents, such as
software codes or business models, directly usable in the production of final goods. Once
a content of this type has been produced, it is in fixed supply, that is, the inventor can only
rent it out (or sell it) or not; hence the quantity restriction typical of monopoly cannot
arise, while competition is viable (Chantrel et al., 2012; Marchese and Privileggi, 2014).
We show that, however, as long as the inventor owning a patent can control through license
activation devices the access to the intellectual content of the workers using her invention
in the final goods production, monopolistic exploitation becomes viable and will occur.
It turns out that in this framework both the level of wages and of consumption and the
rate of growth of the economy are smaller than in the first best, while with elastic labor
supply also labor employment is negatively impacted. This implies that some standard
public policies devised for correcting inefficiencies in development can perform poorly in
this framework.
JEL Classification Numbers: C61, E10, O31, O41.
Keywords: Endogenous growth, patent, monopoly, dematerialized knowledge
1 Introduction
In the recent past one way of highlighting the pace of technical progress was to quote the Moore
law, describing the expected improvements in a widely used intermediate good, the semicon-
ductor. Nowadays, however, technical progress appears largely disembodied, and characterized
by the supply of new immaterial goods such as DNA sequences, software codes, computer pro-
grams, internet applications, business models, etc., which are patentable1 and directly usable
∗Institute POLIS - DiGSPES, Universita` del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”, Via Cavour 84, 15121
Alessandria (Italy). Phone: +39-0131-283718; fax: +39-0131-283704; e-mail carla.marchese@unipmn.it
†Dept. of Economics and Statistics “Cognetti de Martiis”, Universita` di Torino, Lungo Dora Siena 100 A,
10153 Torino (Italy). Phone: +39-011-6702635; fax: +39-011-6703895; e-mail fabio.privileggi@unito.it
1This trend for the U.S. can be dated back to 1998, when in the so called State Street Bank case a business
method was declared patentable. Many other similar rulings followed with respect to software. A 2014 Supreme
Court decision stated that the claim for a patent must contain more than abstract ideas of general character; it
must be based, e.g., on unconventional steps that confine it to a particular useful application. For patentability
in general see Eckert and Langinier (2013).
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in the final goods production, without having to be incorporated into capital or intermediate
inputs. This feature does not fit well into standard endogenous growth models,2 which assume
that, in a system with Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), the successful inventor has the op-
portunity of becoming the sole supplier of a new final or intermediate good, embodying the
results of her activity. She can thus charge a monopoly price and earn a compensation for her
research effort.3 Boldrin and Levine (2008) identify the rival good in which an invention is em-
bedded with the copies reporting it, which can be used for direct consumption or employed for
(time consuming) reproduction. If the inventor is protected by a patent, she gains by restricting
the supply of copies. To avoid this monopolistic exploitation Boldrin and Levine suggest to
abolish the IPR protection. In this way the inventor, by selling the first copy, would have just
the opportunity of recovering the present value of future copies, whose number, however, she
cannot restrict. If the compensation for the first copy is large enough to cover the indivisible
initial cost of producing it, research is viable and efficiency is reached.
While the desirability of allowing the financing of research through patents is debated, a
patent—so goes the mainstream approach—can lead to monopolistic exploitation as long as it
enables the inventor to be the sole producer of a rival good whose supply she can restrict. But if
knowledge is disembodied only the invention itself can be brought to the market, and because
an invention is a discrete good in fixed supply, no quantity restriction, and thus no simple
monopoly exploitation, can occur.4 This implication of disembodied knowledge has prompted
the elaboration of new endogenous growth models, with competitive markets for knowledge, in
which Lindahl prices are paid (Chantrel et al., 2012; Marchese and Privileggi, 2014). In these
markets, even if inventions are protected by patents, the inventor just recovers the present value
of the marginal benefits enjoyed by the users of her invention, and does not earn any monopoly
profit. Moreover, under the standard assumption that patents refer to marginal addition to the
stock of knowledge (which behaves as a continuous homogeneous good when used in the final
goods’ production), no indivisibility problem arises.
In this paper we study a case in which monopolistic exploitation is possible even if knowledge
is disembodied. The basic idea is that disembodied knowledge cannot be used as the sole input
in the final goods’ production, because we do not leave in a world of pure spirits. It must
instead be combined with other physical inputs to produce final goods, among which some will
be rival; in this paper we focus on labor. In such a framework the patent holder can design a
contract by which the invention can be accessed only by workers for which a personal license has
been activated. That is, as long as the cost of using the necessary software and of enforcement
against infringement is not too large, the inventor can set and collect a royalty conditional
on the amount of labor “augmented” by the invention.5 The firms producing final goods can
accept such a contract as long as they pay in total for labor (i.e., for the wage and for the
license) no more than the marginal product of labor.
2Like, e.g., in Romer (1990) and the so called Lab-Equipment model in Chapter 13 of Acemoglu (2009).
3Alternatively, whoever purchases the patent can reap this monopoly profit and hence recover the cost
incurred for compensating the inventor. For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, we will
assume in the following that the inventor does not sell the patent and directly exploits it, and we will use the
terms inventor and patent holder as synonyms.
4Note that also in the Lab-Equipment model the invention per se does not command any profit.
5Besides the examples of personal licenses for scientific software and databases, which are very familiar to
researchers, a business model which is not far from that described in this paper is that of Uber, which renders
its patented business model available to partner firms (the car drivers) and asks for a share of the compensation
paid by the passengers. This compensation, with some simplification, can be described as a compensation for
labor, as long as for the occasional Uber driver the other costs incurred are mainly sunk. Uber is currently
applying for patents to protect its model. While some of its applications have been turned down, it might also
rely to some extent on patents in the same field belonging to some of its investors.
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We show that in this case the inventor can actually earn a monopoly rent. While this case
has some features in common with the standard approach about embedded knowledge followed
in the literature—i.e., in both cases a rival good is exploited—there are differences due to the
fact that, in our case, the rival good also commands a specific compensation not cashed by the
patent holder, namely the wage compensation for labor. We show that in this framework, under
standard assumptions and considering either inelastic or elastic labor supply, economic growth
occurs at a lower rate than in a first-best economy. Moreover, this way of financing research
involves a kind of “taxation” of wages, thus implying a reduction of the workers’ income share
with respect to the first-best.6 A further source of inefficiency is due to the fact that resources
used for activating and maintaining the personal licenses represent a pure waste, as their role
is to exclude those who do not pay from accessing knowledge, i.e., a pure public good whose
marginal cost of use is nil.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present a simple model characterized
by inelastic labor supply and discuss the decentralized static and intertemporal equilibria;
moreover, we show that, as one should expect, the latter is inferior to the corresponding first-
best, social planner equilibrium. In Section 3 we consider the case in which labor is elastically
supplied and show that in this scenario the decentralized equilibrium performs even more
poorly, as also labor supply is being reduced. Finally, Section 4 provides some hints about the
implications of the model in terms of policies and concludes.
2 The model with inelastic labor supply
Let us consider an infinite-horizon economy where the representative household aims at maxi-
mizing the following lifetime utility function:∫ +∞
0
ln [C (t)] e−ρt dt . (1)
where C (t) is aggregate consumption at instant t and ρ > 0 is the (constant) rate of time
preference. There is no demographic growth and labor supply, L, is inelastic.
The instantaneous production function of final goods, echoing those in the Romer/Grossman-
Helpman/Aghion-Howitt models,7 is
Y = Xα (AL)1−α , (2)
with 0 < α < 1, where Y is a composite final good with price 1 (the numeraire), X is an
intermediate good composed of final goods also priced at the numeraire, A is knowledge, which,
from the final good producers’ (F -firms) perspective is a continuous variable representing an
aggregate composition of perfect substitutes, implying that whichever new idea is added to the
stock, it has the same marginal productivity of all other ideas.
The market for final goods is competitive. All the F -firms take prices as given and demand
intermediate goods X and labor L. As raw labor L would be unproductive if not augmented
by knowledge, while it has maximal productivity when the whole knowledge stock A is used,
F -firms are willing to pay for labor the wages to the workers themselves joint with the royalties
to the patent holders who provide personal licenses allowing workers to access the knowledge
stock A for free. As (2) is homogeneous of degree 1 in two variables (augmented labor and
6For an even stronger effect of this type in a competitive economy with disembodied knowledge see Marchese
and Privileggi (2014).
7See Jones (1995).
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the intermediate good) and all the firms pay the same prices, one can consider a representative
firm supplying the whole final goods’ production. The instantaneous profit function Π (X,L)
of the representative F -firm is:
Π (X,L) = Xα (AL)1−α −X − wL−RAL,
where R is the per capita royalty for activating the licenses for the whole stock A. The FOCs
are:
∂Π
∂X
= α
(
AL
X
)1−α
− 1 = 0 (3)
∂Π
∂L
= (1− α)
(
X
L
)α
A1−α − w −RA = 0. (4)
Personal licenses are supplied by many identical firms (R&D-firms) which produced one
unit of A and own the corresponding patent. By solving (4) for RA and dividing the result
by A, it turns out that the representative R&D-firm faces the following inverse demand for
personal licenses:
R (L) = (1− α)
(
X
AL
)α
− w
A
, (5)
where, according to a Nash behavior assumption, it is assumed that the representative R&D-
firm takes the inverse demand as a function of the sole L, while all the other variables are taken
as given. The (instantaneous) profit function of the representative R&D-firm is
pi (L) = R (L)L− βL, (6)
where β ≥ 0 is the constant per capita cost of activating the licenses for one unit of A.
Activation is costly because it entails specific software maintenance and prevention of illegal
access. In order the activation cost to be compatible with positive labor supply the following
assumption is needed.
A. 1 The activation cost is not too large; specifically, β < (1− α)2 α α1−α must hold.
The FOC for profit maximization of the representative R&D-firm turns out to be:
∂pi
∂L
= (1− α)2
(
X
AL
)α
− w
A
− β = 0.
By solving it for the optimal quantity of personal licenses L∗, one gets:
L∗ =
(1− α)2/α
(w/A+ β)1/α
X
A
. (7)
By substituting L∗ into (5), the royalty, as a function of the equilibrium wage w, turns out to
be:
R (w) =
1
1− α
(αw
A
+ β
)
. (8)
The monopoly royalty involves a mark-up over the personal license cost β and is increasing in
the wage w. One can also see (8) as a reaction function of the R&D-firm to the wage arising
on the market.
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2.1 The instantaneous market equilibrium
From (3) one gets:
X = α
1
1−αAL, (9)
which implies that the intermediate good and the augmented labor are used in fixed proportions.
By substituting R (w) as in (8) and X as in (9) into (4) for the F -firm the equilibrium wage
turns out to be:
w =
[
(1− α)2 α α1−α − β
]
A, (10)
which, under Assumption A.1, is strictly positive. Because labor supply is inelastic, the labor
market equilibrium wage level w in (10) implies full employment; therefore, L∗ = L∗(w) = L is
the number of licenses that will actually be sold in the market equilibrium; in other words, all
the given labor supply will be augmented by A.
In summary, the instantaneous market equilibrium is characterized as follows:
i) R&D-firms maximize their profit by choosing the optimal royalty R(w) in (8) as a function
of the equilibrium wage w;
ii) the representative F -firm maximizes its profit taking R(w) and w as given;
iii) the labor market clears at the equilibrium wage w and, as labor supply is inelastic, this
occurs at full employment.
According to (4), such characterization implies that the marginal product of labor equals
the (augmented) labor marginal cost, which is given by the sum of a) the equilibrium wage w
and b) the term R (w)A, where R (w) is the optimal royalty in (8); R (w)A is paid for allowing
each worker to access the whole available knowledge stock.
The wage in (10) should be compared with the wage ŵ, equal to the marginal product of
labor, that would arise in a first-best economy in which the government intervenes by collecting a
lump-sum tax to finance knowledge production and then releases it for free. Wage ŵ is obtained
by setting R = 0 and using (9) into (4):
ŵ = (1− α)α α1−αA. (11)
Clearly, ŵ > w, as workers under monopolistic exploitation of knowledge earn a wage smaller
than in a first-best economy at any given A level. They also bear the full personal licenses’
activation cost βA.
By plugging (10) into (8) we get
R = (1− α)α 11−α + β,
which, when used in (6), yields the R&D-firm profit:
pi (L) = (1− α)α 11−αL. (12)
Hence, under the assumption of inelastic labor supply, the R&D-firm profit turns out to be
constant.
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2.2 The intertemporal equilibrium
To keep our analysis simple, we assume that one unit of knowledge is produced at the constant
cost δ. In order both to finance the research cost and to satisfy the free entry condition the
following equality must hold:
V (t) =
∫ +∞
t
(1− α)α 11−αLe−
∫ v
t r(s) ds dv = δ. (13)
It postulates that the present value of future (instantaneous) profits, as defined in (12), must
be equal to the (constant) production cost of a unit of new knowledge incurred at instant t.
By differentiating with respect to time in (13), the interest rate turns out to be constant:
r =
(1− α)α 11−αL
δ
. (14)
Because the only asset in the economy is the knowledge stock A owned by households, from
(13) it follows that the instantaneous household’s asset is given by V (t)A (t) = δA (t), and,
taking into account the interest rate as in (14), her problem is that of maximizing (1) under
the dynamic budget constraint
A˙ (t) =
1
δ
[pi (L)A (t) + wL− C (t)] , (15)
where pi (L), w are given by (12) and (10) respectively. In order to obtain a Balanced Growth
Path (BGP) type of equilibrium note that, because pi (L) and w in (15) are both constants, the
ratio C/A must be constant as well, so that A˙/A = C˙/C must hold; moreover, after replacing
(9) into (2), it is clearly seen that Y˙ /Y = A˙/A as well. Hence, using (14) in the standard Euler
condition [recall that the instantaneous utility in (1) is logarithmic] we obtain the following
constant rate of growth of consumption, C, knowledge, A, and output, Y , along the BGP:
g =
C˙
C
=
A˙
A
=
Y˙
Y
=
(1− α)α 11−αL
δ
− ρ. (16)
The growth rate8 g is positive whenever (1− α)α 11−αL > δρ, while the transversality condition
at infinity holds because, from (14) and (16), it follows that r > g; also, as (9) requires
that X (0) = α
1
1−αLA (0), the economy starts immediately on the BGP, that is, there are no
transitions.
2.3 The first-best, social planner equilibrium
To compare g as in (16) to the rate of growth that would arise in a first-best economy, let us
consider the corresponding social planner problem. The resource constraint at instant t is
C (t) + J (t) = Y (t)−X (t) , (17)
where J (t) represents the amount of output invested in R&D activity, and on the RHS the total
output net of the intermediate goods is considered. Dropping time dependency for simplicity,
in order to obtain a dynamic constraint in the only variables A (state) and C (control) a
8Of course, as postulated by Jones (1995; 1999; 2005) for knowledge-based endogenous growth models, this
type of model exhibits the strong scale effect ; i.e., the growth rate of the economy increases in population size.
6
social planner first considers maximization of the net output Y −X = Xα (AL)1−α −X with
respect to X for a given stock A at instant t: the solution turns out to be the same as in (9),
XS = α
1
1−αAL, where the superscript “S” denotes the level of intermediate good chosen by the
social planner. Hence, net output is Y S −XS =
[
α
α
1−α − α 11−α
]
LA = (1− α)α α1−αLA. Under
our assumption of a constant cost equal to δ required to produce one unit of new knowledge,
J = δA˙, so that (17) can be rewritten as
A˙ =
1
δ
[
(1− α)α α1−αLA− C
]
. (18)
Denoting by λ (t) the costate variable associated to the unique dynamic constraint (18) and
dropping the time argument for simplicity, the current-value Hamiltonian of the social planner
problem is
H (A,C, λ) = ln (C) + λ
(1− α)α α1−αLA− C
δ
.
Necessary conditions are
1
C
=
λ
δ
(19)
λ˙ = ρλ− λ(1− α)α
α
1−αL
δ
(20)
lim
t→+∞
λ (t)A (t) e−ρt = 0, (21)
where (21) is the transversality condition. Differentiating (19) with respect to time and coupling
the result with (20), using (18) and rearranging terms we obtain the following consumption
growth rate:9
gS =
C˙
C
=
A˙
A
=
Y˙
Y
=
(1− α)α α1−αL
δ
− ρ. (22)
As 0 < α < 1 implies α
α
1−α > α
1
1−α , the social planner growth rate gS is clearly larger than
the decentralized one g in (16). This result is somewhat unexpected, because a system with
personal licenses, although characterized by monopolistic exploitation, involves features that
should sustain efficiency, namely: i) the whole labor is used, like in the first-best; ii) the burden
of monopolistic exploitation is borne in full by workers, through a reduction of their wage
which settles strictly below their marginal product; iii) instantaneous efficiency in production
is preserved, because the composite factor AL is paid its marginal product; iv) research is
financed in a non distortionary way through a tax on labor supply, which is inelastic. The
intuition for the result relies on a dynamic inefficiency arising because the profit obtained by
patent holders falls short of the marginal product of knowledge. This implies a too small
interest rate and thus a too small growth.
3 The case of elastic labor supply
To tackle the case of elastic labor supply let us normalize the labor potential supply of the
households to one; that is, the actual instantaneous labor supply is now 0 ≤ L (t) ≤ 1. We
focus on a case in which labor supply, while being variable, tends to a constant in the steady
9The transversality condition (21) holds because, by differentiating (19) with respect to time, we get λ˙/λ =
−C˙/C, so that λ˙/λ+ A˙/A = −C˙/C + A˙/A = 0 < ρ. Again the economy starts immediately on the BGP.
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state,10 in which the economy evolves along an Asymptotic Balanced Growth Path (ABGP).
Let us adopt the following specification of the household utility function:∫ +∞
0
u (t) e−ρt dt,
with
u (t) = lnC (t) + γ ln [1− L (t)] , (23)
where γ ≥ 0 indicates the preference for leisure and C (t) refers to individual consumption
(equal to total consumption). As from now on we focus on the steady state in which labor
supply is constant, all the results pertaining to profits and prices presented in the previous
sections hold, with L being now some value between 0 and 1. We need to further restrict
the range of values for the activation cost in order to allow for positive labor supply in the
equilibrium.
A. 2 The activation cost β satisfies 0 ≤ β < (1− α)2 α α1−α − γρδ.
The constrained maximization of utility in (23) implies the following consumption-leisure
optimality condition:
C =
w (1− L)
γ
, (24)
while, when monopolistic exploitation occurs, the household budget constraint is the same as
in (15) and can be rewritten in the more general form
A˙ = rA+
1
δ
(wL− C) . (25)
In the steady state the economy evolves along the ABGP at the constant rate given by the
Euler equation, g = C˙/C = A˙/A = Y˙ /Y = r − ρ, so that (25) can be rewritten as:
C = rδA+ wL− δA˙ = rδA+ wL− δgA = wL+ (r − g) δA
= wL+ ρδA, (26)
where in the last equality we used the Euler equation. Coupling (26) with (24) and using (10)
one gets:
L =
1
1 + γ
[
1− γρδ
(1− α)2 α α1−α − β
]
, (27)
which, under Assumption A.2, yields a positive amount of labor L along the ABGP equilibrium.
It turns out that the larger the license activation cost β, the smaller is labor supply. That is,
β, by reducing the wage, reduces labor supply via the substitution effect. Under variable labor
supply the economy is thus more deeply impacted by the personal license system than with
inelastic labor supply.
As the interest rate is the same as in (14), along the ABGP the growth rate is again given by
the Euler equation and is equal to g in (16), but with L given by (27) instead of the inelastically
supplied value used there. To compare this growth rate to that of a first-best economy, again
we consider the corresponding social planner problem. The resource constraint is the same as
in (17), and after following the same steps as in Section 2.3, one easily gets the same dynamic
10For this approach see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp. 422-431, and Chu et al. (2012).
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constraint as in (18). Hence, denoting by λ the costate variable associated to it, now the
current-value Hamiltonian of the social planner problem is
H (A,C, L, λ) = ln (C) + γ ln (1− L) + λ(1− α)α
α
1−αLA− C
δ
.
Necessary conditions are
1
C
=
λ
δ
(28)
γ
1− L = λ
(1− α)α α1−αA
δ
(29)
λ˙ = ρλ− λ(1− α)α
α
1−αL
δ
, (30)
plus the same transversality condition as in (21). Differentiating (28) with respect to time and
coupling the result with (30), using (18) and rearranging terms once more we easily obtain
the same expression for the growth rate11 as in (22), only that now gS is determined by the
optimal amount of labor LS chosen by the social planner to be employed in the producing
sector, instead of the amount obtained in (27):
gS =
C˙
C
=
A˙
A
=
Y˙
Y
=
(1− α)α α1−αLS
δ
− ρ. (31)
To find LS, by coupling (28) and (29) we first obtain the optimal consumption/knowledge
ratio, which, again, must be constant along the ABGP:
C
A
=
(1− α)α α1−α
γ
(
1− LS) ,
and then, by replacing it into the resource constraint (18) and using (31),
A˙
A
=
(1− α)α α1−αLS
δ
− (1− α)α
α
1−α
γδ
(
1− LS) = gS = (1− α)α α1−αLS
δ
− ρ,
we easily get
LS = 1− γρδ
(1− α)α α1−α . (32)
Through a quick comparison between (32) and (27) it is immediately seen that LS > L for
any γ ≥ 0, which, in turn, as α α1−α > α 11−α , when used in (31), implies that the social planner
growth rate is again strictly larger than the decentralized one in (16):
gS =
(1− α)α α1−αLS
δ
− ρ > (1− α)α
1
1−αL
δ
− ρ = g. (33)
Note that when labor supply is elastic the gap between gS and g is even larger than that with
inelastic labor supply: in (33), besides the terms α
α
1−α > α
1
1−α already making the difference
in Section 2, according to (32) and (27) the equilibrium labor amounts LS > L further add
to such a difference. In fact when labor supply is elastic not only the intertemporal allocation
of resources is distorted, but also the instantaneous efficiency of the economy is negatively
affected, since workers react to the drop of wages by restricting their labor supply.
11The same argument as in footnote 9 establishes that the transversality condition (21) holds.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper we considered an economy in which knowledge is dematerialized, patented, and
directly usable in the final goods’ production. The patent holders are able to earn monopoly
profits because they provide on an exclusive basis personal licenses to the workers involved in
final goods’ production, as a condition for letting them access knowledge contents. Contracts
providing the activation of personal licenses for agents operating within firms are actually used
in the fields of software, data banks, access to on-line commercial and financial platforms,
etc.. Economic growth and welfare are negatively affected in an economy in which knowledge is
financed in this way. Wages fall short of the labor marginal product. At the same time, also the
compensation received by research is lower than its marginal product, thus implying insufficient
incentives for knowledge accumulation and, in turn, slower growth. Moreover, costs borne to
secure the exclusion of those not holding a license from accessing knowledge, which is a public
good, imply that resources are wasted. The amount of resources devoted to exclusion clearly
also contributes to slowing growth under elastic labor supply. If one considers the burgeoning
number of new patents granted every year, the role that they have in productive activities and
the frequent litigations for infringements,12 the size of the ensuing inefficiency due to the effort
for excluding those who do not pay is likely to be large.
A notable implication of the model is the compression of the labor income share, at the
benefit of the income share accruing to the patent holders. The decline of the income share of
labor at the advantage of the share going to intangibles and particularly to holders of patents
that occurred in many countries since the 1980s, is a stylized fact that has attracted much
attention (Corrado et al., 2009; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Koh et al., 2015) and whose
motivations are widely debated. The model presented in this paper provides a possible rationale,
based on the shift that occurred in the last decades from an economy in which technological
progress was mainly embedded in physical capital to an economy characterized by the diffusion
of information technology and by knowledge dematerialization. Hence, nowadays on the one
hand in many instances knowledge directly augments the labor productivity but, on the other
hand, it also commands a larger share of the ensuing income.
As far as policies aimed at correcting the inefficiencies are concerned, a standard suggestion
arising in Lab-Equipment models is to provide subsidies, financed by non-distortionary taxes, to
support the demand of the capital inputs which embody new ideas. In the case here considered
the relevant demand, however, is that of labor. But the benefits of subsidies to support labor
demand would flow only partially to finance research, while, according to equation (8), for
the remaining part they would boost the wage. The latter effect does not contribute at all to
economic growth if labor supply is inelastic. Even if it is not, a single tool cannot be tuned to
pursue two objectives, i.e., bringing both the labor and the knowledge supply at the efficient
level. More appropriate policy intervention may instead involve the public funding of research,
in order to release the results for free and get rid of the exclusion costs. If this approach is
deemed undesirable as it would endanger the market incentives for research, the government
could, e.g., sponsor tournaments for eliciting inventive activity (Taylor, 1995), or buy patents
and put the results into the public domain (Marchese et al., 2014). The sole abolition of the
patent system, instead, does not seems to be a suitable remedy against monopolistic exploitation
when knowledge is dematerialized, because in this case the research results are very close to a
pure public good, and thus highly exposed to the danger of large free riding.
12See, e.g., Boldrin and Levine (2013).
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